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INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING CALLS TO DEFUND THE POLICE 
During the summer of 2020, the police killings of George Floyd, 
Breonna Taylor, and others created a movement that unearthed a 
reality that Black people in the United States have always been aware 
of: systemic racism, in the form of police brutality, is alive and well.  
While the blatant brutality of George Floyd’s murder at the hands of 
police is the flame,1 the spark was ignited long ago.  One need only 
review the record of recent years — the killings of Eric Garner, 
Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, Antwon Rose, Alton Sterling, Philando 
Castile, Breonna Taylor, and countless other souls have led to this 
particular season of widespread protests and organized demands for 
 
 1.  See Oliver Holmes, George Floyd Killing Sparks Protests Across US: At a 
Glance Guide, GUARDIAN (May 30, 2020, 6:58 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/may/30/george-floyd-protests-latest-at-a-
glance-white-house [https://perma.cc/FHH5-L93D]. For an understanding of how 
George Floyd was killed, see Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in 
Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html 
[https://perma.cc/S8JE-T8E4]. 
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change. 2   This is a historical moment of tremendous civil unrest, 
deemed by many as a revived Civil Rights Movement.3 
While various reform-seeking legislative measures have been in 
process for the past several years, this particular moment is different 
and calls for a different response.  Protests and demonstrations erupted 
on stages large and small, drawing attention to social justice issues.4  
From schools to small businesses to large corporations, institutions 
across the country issued statements pledging themselves and their 
finances to antiracism work.5  As the focus turns from necessary protest 
to tangible progress, what remains unanswered is how best to proceed.  
Professor Ibram X. Kendi described antiracism as “a radical choice in 
the face of this history, requiring a radical reorientation of our 
consciousness.”6  One such “radical choice” is defunding the police. 
Police defunding can follow many models, but two have emerged 
most prominently among activists and scholars.  Under one, 
jurisdictions completely disband entire police departments, offering 
leaders the opportunity to begin afresh and draft community-led public 
safety prototypes that do not include police at all.7  Under the other, 
 
 2. See Alia Chughtai, Know Their Names: Black People Killed by the Police in 
the US, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 21, 2020), 
https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2020/know-their-names/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/C5TX-GBNW]; Holmes, supra note 1. 
 3. See Valerie Strauss, This Is My Generation’s Civil Rights Movement, WASH. 
POST (June 6, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/06/06/this-is-my-generations-civil-ri
ghts-movement/ [https://perma.cc/8BZG-24CS]. 
 4. See, e.g., Marc J. Spears, ‘Black Lives Matter, People’: How the NBA’s Social 
Justice Efforts Dominated the Season, UNDEFEATED (Oct. 12, 2020), 
https://theundefeated.com/features/how-the-nba-social-justice-efforts-dominated-the-
season/ [https://perma.cc/W3QG-FAL3]. 
 5. For a list of large businesses making such pledges, see Nivedita Balu & 
Aishwarya Venugopal, Factbox: Corporations Pledge $1.7 Billion to Address Racism, 
Injustice, REUTERS (June 9, 2020, 9:48 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-minneapolis-police-pledges-factbox/factbox-corpo
rations-pledge-1-7-billion-to-address-racism-injustice-idUKKBN23H06S 
[https://perma.cc/SE77-KG65]. For an example of what educational institutions are 
doing, see Law Deans Anti-Racism Clearinghouse Project, ASS’N AM. L. SCHS., 
https://www.aals.org/antiracist-clearinghouse/ [https://perma.cc/T8PL-7FAU] (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2021). 
 6. IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 23 (2019). 
 7. See Scottie Andrew, There’s a Growing Call to Defund the Police. Here’s What 
It Means, CNN (June 17, 2020, 10:32 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/us/what-is-defund-police-trnd/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/D43B-ECVX]; Dionne Searcey, What Would Efforts to Defund or 
Disband Police Departments Really Mean?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/us/what-does-defund-police-mean.html 
[https://perma.cc/HR6J-JWNU]. 
628 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
police departments’ coffers are divested, to varying degrees, and funds 
are reallocated to various social services to reduce, but not wholly 
eliminate, police contact with the community.8  While different, these 
models have been described as analogous, as both seek to shift sole 
responsibility for public safety away from police departments.9 
Regardless of the ultimate design, the fundamental idea behind 
defunding the police is that the United States’ system of policing is 
systemically racist and eradicating that racism requires dismantling.  
Diversion of police funding, which is often the most expensive line item 
of large cities’ budgets,10 would shift focus “away from surveillance and 
punishment, and toward fostering equitable, healthy, and safe 
communities.”11  Funding would instead be diverted to, among other 
things, strengthen crisis care capacity and hire and train social service 
workers, with the hope of decreasing negative interactions with police 
and bettering community relations.12  In essence, the modern call to 
defund the police is actually “a call to reinvent our criminal justice 
system to better honor our national pledge of equal justice under the 
law.”13 
While there has been increased support for police reform and 
recognition of systemic racism throughout the country, the particular 
call to defund the police has created considerable controversy and has 
not reached widespread consensus.14  Although the long-held belief in 
police “super powers” is crumbling,15 the majority of Americans do not 
 
 8. See Andrew, supra note 7; Searcey, supra note 7. 
 9. See Andrew, supra note 7. 
 10. See Carl Sullivan & Carla Baranauckas, Here’s How Much Money Goes to 




 11. Annie Lowrey, Defund the Police, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/defund-police/612682/ 
[https://perma.cc/HUX3-ZB8M]. 
 12. See Sean Collins, The Financial Case for Defunding the Police, VOX (Sept. 23, 
2020, 7:16 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/21430892/defund-the-police-funding-abolish-georg
e-floyd-breonna-taylor-daniel-prude [https://perma.cc/CUZ4-LGX5]. 
 13. Steven L. Hostetler & Andre B. Gammage, OK Boomers, What’s Going On?, 
64 RES GESTAE 19, 27 (2020). 
 14. See Nicole Goodkind, The Vast Majority of Americans Don’t Want to Defund 
the Police, FORTUNE (July 9, 2020, 2:58 PM), 
https://fortune.com/2020/07/09/defund-the-police-poll-most-americans-oppose-defund
ing-police-departments/ [https://perma.cc/N363-V2J5]. 
 15. See Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits 
of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1451 (2016). 
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support wholesale defunding and instead advocate for specific 
reforms;16 35% of participants in a 2020 Pew study recorded that 
the police use the correct amount of force in every situation, 
compared to 45% in 2016.17  Likewise, the share of people who 
believe police treat racial and ethnic groups equally dropped from 
47% in 2016 to 34% in 2020, and the share of those who thought 
the justice system should hold officers accountable when 
misconduct occurs rose to 44% in 2020, compared to 31% in 
2016.18  A 2018 poll found that two-thirds of people in the United 
States support banning chokeholds.19 
Most Americans do support disciplining police misconduct and 
lessening protections against legal action.20  Seventy-four percent of 
Americans believe that police violence against the public is a problem, 
and 42% believe it is a major problem.21  Nevertheless, only 25% of 
Americans endorse decreased spending on police forces.22  In many 
ways, polling reveals a public misunderstanding of what defunding the 
police actually means.  Polls indicate that people balk at the term 
“defund the police” but appear more open if directly asked if they 
support shifting money allocated to police toward specific social 
services.23 
This Article argues that discomfort with defunding the police is 
misplaced.  Understanding policing as a form of punishment clarifies 
 
 16. See Poll: Voters Oppose ‘Defund the Police’ but Back Major Reforms, 
POLITICO (June 17, 2020, 4:30 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/17/poll-voters-defund-police-reforms-324774 
[https://perma.cc/2YAM-Y4ZQ]. 
 17. See Majority of Public Favors Giving Civilians the Power to Sue Police Officers 





 18. See id. 




 20. Two-thirds of Pew respondents and three-quarters of Kaiser participants 
responded affirmatively. See id.; Power to Sue Police Officers, supra note 17. 
 21. See HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 19. 
 22. See Power to Sue Police Officers, supra note 17. 
 23. See Giovanni Russonello, Have Americans Warmed to Calls to ‘Defund the 
Police’?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/us/politics/polling-defund-the-police.html 
[https://perma.cc/B9VE-NLKD]. 
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how reforming policing — including defunding the police — fits within 
the broader, more widely accepted sentencing reforms that have taken 
place in recent years.  The Supreme Court has refused to recognize 
policing as punishment, and several scholars have commented on the 
Court’s failure to do so.24  Adding to this conversation, this Article 
asserts that policing is punishment and demonstrates that policing 
reform is rightly situated within discussions of overall sentencing 
reform.  Sentencing reform supported on both sides of the political 
aisle recognizes that jurisdictions have spent money on incarceration 
but have not actually accomplished punishment goals.  When resources 
are re-directed to support legitimate punitive goals better, then not 
only are resources saved but also systemic racism can be addressed. 
As it stands, purposeless punishment 25  only serves to support 
institutional bias.  The same is true for retaining the current system of 
policing.  Once one understands that the current policing model in the 
United States facilitates purposeless punishment, its only remaining 
plausible objective is to sustain a system of racial oppression.  To truly 
begin eradicating racism in policing, it is imperative to place policing 
reform in the broader context of sentencing reform and begin 
approaching all forms of punishment with an antiracist lens. 
Part I of this Article addresses the racist roots of policing in the 
United States and explores how racism is evident in police funding 
structures.  It explains the racial trauma associated with policing 
practices and argues that defunding and restructuring policing is 
necessary for rebuilding a shattered democracy.  Part II confronts the 
Supreme Court’s traditional Fourth Amendment analysis of excessive 
force claims against police officers to reveal the failures of that 
approach, examining the cases of Breonna Taylor, Michael Brown, and 
other Black people who have been killed by the police.  Through these 
tragic cases, the inadequacy of treating police use of force only under 
a Fourth Amendment seizure analysis is strikingly evident.  Part III 
 
 24. For a description of the Court’s error in not recognizing that the use of force by 
police can be a form of punishment, see Mitchell F. Crusto, Black Lives Matter: 
Banning Police Lynchings, 48 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 3, 36–50 (2020). See also Jelani 
Jefferson Exum, The Death Penalty on the Streets: What the Eighth Amendment Can 
Teach About Regulating Police Use of Force, 80 MO. L. REV. 987 (2015) [hereinafter 
Jefferson Exum, Death Penalty on the Streets]. 
 25. The term “purposeless punishment” is meant to refer to punishment that does 
not serve any of the recognized penological goals: incapacitation, incarceration, 
rehabilitation, deterrence, or retribution. For a discussion of how sentencing laws often 
lead to purposeless punishment, see Jelani Jefferson Exum, Forget Sentencing 
Equality: Moving from the “Cracked” Cocaine Debate Toward Particular Purpose 
Sentencing, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 95 (2014) [hereinafter Jefferson Exum, Forget 
Sentencing Equality]. 
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develops the argument that the courts should treat certain actions by 
police as punishment subject to Eighth Amendment protection.  Part 
IV connects this punishment view of policing to sentencing reform 
efforts to support the view that reforming policing fits within the 
punishment reform context.  Because recent sentencing reforms have 
not adequately addressed systemic racism, Part V ends this Article by 
discussing the flaws in sentencing reform and the work that still needs 
to be done to address racism in all types of state-imposed punishment 
— including policing. 
I. POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES: SYSTEMIC RACISM, RACIAL 
TRAUMA, AND THE NEED TO REBUILD DEMOCRACY 
It is no secret that U.S. policing is systemically racist.  The U.S. 
policing model is to target discriminatorily, surveil persistently, 
prosecute fervently, and punish vigorously.  This includes using deadly 
force against individuals through a variety of means, but most 
frequently by shooting. 26   In 2019, police officers fatally shot 999 
people.27   Unsurprisingly, the bulk of the oppressive effects of this 
“punitive and primitive,”28 heavy-handed approach to criminal justice 
is borne by Black people.29 
 
 26. “Lethal force includes shooting of firearms, chokehold, strangulation, stun guns 
aka Tasers, shooting rubber bullets, attack dogs, the injection of ketamine, aggravated 
assault, simple battery, no-knock raids, and failing to come to a person’s aid in a timely 
manner.” Crusto, supra note 24, at 6 n.21; see also The Counted: People Killed by 
Police in the US, GUARDIAN [hereinafter The Counted], 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-
killings-us-database [https://perma.cc/RWS8-B596] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021); 
MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, https://mappingpoliceviolence.org 
[https://perma.cc/6ESQ-3HPN] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (providing a database of the 
forms of officer-caused death, the majority of which are from gun violence). 
 27. See Fatal Force: 999 People Were Shot and Killed by Police in 2019, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 10, 2020) [hereinafter Fatal Force], 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-2019/ 
[https://perma.cc/6G2K-SBWZ]. 
 28. See Hostetler & Gammage, supra note 13, at 27. 
 29. See The Counted, supra note 26; Law Enforcement and Violence: The Divide 
Between Black and White Americans, ASSOCIATED PRESS & NORC [hereinafter Law 
Enforcement and Violence], 
https://apnorc.org/projects/law-enforcement-and-violence-the-divide-between-black-a
nd-white-americans/ [https://perma.cc/XD7Z-QWKF] (last visited Feb. 3, 2021); see 
also Ryan Gabrielson, Eric Sagara & Ryann Grochowski Jones, Deadly Force, in Black 
and White, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 10, 2014, 11:07 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-in-black-and-white 
[https://perma.cc/SE75-W39A]. 
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A. U.S. Policing Is Systemically Racist 
Police officers kill Black people at more than twice the rate of white 
people.30  These racially disparate outcomes are no surprise given the 
roots of policing in the United States.  Proponents of police defunding 
rely, in part, on U.S. policing’s origin story and historical ties to slavery 
in arguing for a complete overhaul of policing.31 
i. The Racist Roots of Policing 
It is well-documented that modern policing’s ancestry lies in slave 
patrols.32  During slavery, “[t]he use of race as a ‘free-floating proxy’ 
for criminality” was a necessary social control and manipulation tool 
and indispensable in upholding “the de facto and de jure unequal social 
relationships arising out of slavery.”33  In short, “[p]olice have long 
been the face of oppression to Black people.”34  Policing in the South 
was forged from slave patrols, while policing in non-slave states 
emerged as an effort to control and regulate the lives of free Blacks 
whom they considered dangerous.35  In the South, slave patrols, whose 
power derived from restrictive slave codes, wielded unlimited authority 
over Black bodies.36  Their tasks were to “terrorize enslaved Blacks to 
deter revolts, capture and return enslaved Blacks trying to escape, and 
discipline those who violated any plantation rules.” 37   As a result, 
“[s]ince America’s founding, this assumption of dangerousness 
subjected free Blacks to constant scrutiny and invasion of privacy by 
white authorities.”38  Professor William Carter, Jr. acknowledged the 
racist underbelly of policing in labeling modern-day racial profiling as 
a “‘badge and incident’ of slavery.” 39   He wrote of the stigma of 
 
 30. See, e.g., The Counted, supra note 26; Gabrielson et al., supra note 29; Law 
Enforcement and Violence, supra note 29. 
 31. See Andrew, supra note 7. 
 32. See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for 
Combatting Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 56–57 (2004); Brandon 
Hasbrouck, Abolishing Racist Policing with the Thirteenth Amendment, 68 UCLA L. 
REV. DISCOURSE 200, 206 (2020). 
 33. Carter, Jr., supra note 32, at 56–57. 
 34. Hasbrouck, supra note 32, at 210. 
 35. See id. at 206. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 208. 
 39. See Carter, Jr., supra note 32, at 86 n.358 (quoting Larry J. Pittman, 
Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: The Intersection of the Thirteenth 
Amendment and Health Care Treatments Having Disproportionate Impacts on 
Disfavored Groups, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 774, 851 n.295 (1998)). 
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dangerousness and criminality that, incident to slavery’s legacy, 
automatically attaches to Blackness.  The stain is permanent, 
burdensome, and cannot be overcome by “high personal 
achievement,” “education,” “wealth,” or “personal appearance.”40  In 
his words, “racial profiling is a modern manifestation of the historical 
presumption, still lingering from slavery, that African Americans are 
congenital criminals rightfully subject to constant suspicion because of 
their skin color.”41  He further wrote: 
[T]he legally enforced stereotype of black criminality has a 
particularly injurious effect on African Americans, given their history 
of enduring legally enforced and officially sanctioned enslavement, 
apartheid and mistreatment.  The image in the collective white mind 
of blacks (particularly black men) as congenital criminals is perhaps 
the most deeply entrenched stereotype pervading the black-white 
relationship in America.  The pervasiveness of this assumption 
reveals that it rests upon deeply rooted historical attitudes and is not 
simply the result of individual racial bias. . . .   
 This stigma remains one that African Americans cannot escape, 
regardless of their individual circumstances.42 
Professor Carter identified that the “pervasive and indiscriminate” 
stigma of criminality associated with Blackness is no accident.  Rather, 
it is the living legacy of slavery and its progeny — systemic racism.  The 
entrenched racism that anchors the foundations of policing must be 
unearthed and wholly dismantled.  Identifying some underlying core 
contributions to the bloating of police budgets is integral to 
understanding the urgent call to defund. 
ii. Police Funding Is Systemically Racist 
Like the genesis of policing itself, the justification for exorbitant 
spending on police budgets is also steeped in racism.  Scholars note that 
the rise in federal aid to police departments was not coincidental.  An 
examination of racial threat theory demonstrates this.  Racial threat 
theory posits that “[l]ocal increases in racial minority populations are 
thought to pose threats to the political standing, economic power, and 
physical safety of white citizens, who respond by lobbying local 
government for increased social control.”43  Such lobbying has resulted 
 
 40. Id. at 25. 
 41. Id. at 56. 
 42. Id. at 24–25. 
 43. Robert Vargas & Philip McHarris, Race and State in City Police Spending 
Growth: 1980 to 2010, 3 SOCIO. RACE & ETHNICITY 96, 96 (2017). 
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in increased spending on police budgets.  Per racial threat theory, white 
people understand the growth of communities of color as potentially 
threatening to their interests and respond by urging for increased crime 
controls.44  Recent studies demonstrate the systemic nature of racial 
threat and spending and suggest that “racial threat operates not only 
through how local governments socially control racial minorities but 
also through relationships between local and federal government that 
help cities afford such social control efforts.”45 
The efforts to advance the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 (Clinton Crime Bill), a “well-documented” 
failure,46 is one example of this.  For the past 20 years, the Clinton 
Crime Bill has been responsible for boosting police budgets and 
keeping city police departments afloat during times of financial 
distress. 47   The Clinton Crime Bill established the Office of 
Community Oriented Police Services (COPS), which allocated grants 
of varying sizes to municipalities to purchase equipment, move officers 
from desk duty to the streets, and create community policing 
programs.48  The Clinton Crime Bill is also credited with injecting over 
$8 billion into budget coffers to hire more police officers.49  Today, it is 
known as one of the major drivers of mass incarceration.50 
Supporters of the Clinton Crime Bill utilized racialized language 
emphasizing inherent Black criminality to justify passage and urge 
support,51 including “references to fear of Black crime in the wake of 
racially motivated riots in Los Angeles and New York” and a call “to 
‘restore order in society.’” 52   This type of pressure from national 
leaders often “trigger[s] local feelings of threat in the majority 
population.”53  Here, the result was the construction of more jails and 
prisons and the passage of a myriad of laws that significantly increased 
 
 44. See id. at 97. 
 45. Id. at 105. 
 46. See ED CHUNG, BETSY PEARL & LEA HUN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE 1994 




 47. The other source of funding is emergency preparedness funds from the 
Department of Homeland Security. See Vargas & McHarris, supra note 43, at 98. 
 48. See id. at 99. 
 49. See id. at 98–99. 
 50. See CHUNG ET AL., supra note 46, at 1. 
 51. See Vargas & McHarris, supra note 43, at 99. 
 52. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 53. Id. 
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incarceration lengths and extinguished opportunities for early 
release.54  The Clinton Crime Bill cost taxpayers an overwhelming sum 
of money55 and ushered in an era of discriminatory, ineffective, and 
inefficient punishment of Black men.56 
Like the Clinton Crime Bill, the current pro-America (and pro-
white) atmosphere, whose fire has been stoked by a president, 57 
motivates racial threat, particularly perceived threats to white financial 
or political interests. 58   Racial threat theory offers that white 
perceptions of communities of colors’ encroachment upon white 
economic resources lead to initiatives aimed at preserving the white 
status quo and white economic dominance, even in the form of 
increased police spending.59 
The result of this fear-based police spending over time is 
unsustainable costs to state and local governments.  In 35 of the 50 most 
populous U.S. cities, police department appropriations generally 
account for the largest budget allotment; local annual police budgets 
can range from $100 million to over $5 billion, often outsizing social 
services spending.60  For example, in New Orleans, police spending 
accounts for 17% of the city budget — approximately $194 million61 — 
compared with $56 million budgeted for community development.62  
Chicago’s 2020 budget predicted police budget expenditures of $2 
billion, 15% of the city budget.63  In 2017, state and local government 
spending across the United States totaled $114 billion on police forces 
alone.64 
 
 54. See CHUNG ET AL., supra note 46, at 1. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See, e.g., Jeff Maskovsky, Towards the Anthropology of White Nationalist 
Postracialism, 7 HAU 433, 433 (2017); Joe Hagan & Emily Jane Fox, “Nationalism Will 
Run Roughshod over Democracy”: What Can Nazi Germany Tell Us About Trump’s 
GOP?, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 18, 2020), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/09/what-can-nazi-germany-tell-us-about-trump
s-gop [https://perma.cc/L68R-DA6W]; Clarence Page, Trump Wants to Be Called a 




 58. See Vargas & McHarris, supra note 43, at 97. 
 59. See id. 
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Increased police spending does not equal safer streets.  In 2018, 
police officers arrested or killed 62% of murder suspects65 and closed 
53% of aggravated assault cases, 30% of robbery cases, and 33% of rape 
cases. 66   Despite increased spending, these rates of solved crimes, 
known as clearance rates, have remained roughly identical for 
decades. 67   Rather than spending resources to reduce crime, 
governments have been wasting resources on perpetuating racial 
trauma. 
B. Policing and Racial Trauma 
U.S. policing, with its focus on racial profiling and racially biased 
enforcement strategies,68 regularly inflicts trauma on Black people and 
“undermines effective policing.”69  As a result of racial profiling, Black 
people deemed criminals experience “fear, anxiety, humiliation, anger, 
resentment, and cynicism.” 70   In addition to these more well-
documented destructive repercussions of police misconduct and racial 
profiling, the perpetual trauma that Black people suffer at the hands of 
the police provides another justification for a complete revamping of 
the police system.  The trauma that Black people in the United States 
endure should be viewed as punishment that warrants Eighth 
Amendment protection. 
This Article uses the term “cultural trauma” to describe the 
traumatic stress and mental and psychological impact that Black 
people suffer as a result of the relentless effects of systemic oppression, 
discrimination, and racism.71  Cultural trauma is a socially permitted 
phenomenon that “occur[s] when groups endure horrific events that 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 589–90 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (finding that the New York City Police Department was liable for a consistent 
practice of racial profiling as well as unconstitutional stops); Darius Charney, 




 69. See Carter, Jr., supra note 32, at 24. 
 70. S. 989, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 71. See Thema Bryant-Davis, Healing Requires Recognition: The Case for 
Race-Based Traumatic Stress, 35 COUNSELING PSYCH. 135, 135 (2007); Robert T. 
Carter et al., Race-Based Traumatic Stress, Racial Identity Statuses, and Psychological 
Functioning: An Exploratory Investigation, 48 PRO. PSYCH. 30, 30 (2017). 
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forever change their consciousness and identity.”72  In encountering 
cultural trauma, members of a group are collectively subjected to an 
atrocious, disturbing event that permanently scars group 
consciousness, “marking their memories forever and changing their 
future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways.”73  Due to the 
United States’ burdensome and overwhelming history of 
discrimination against minority groups, communities of color often 
experience shared trauma, transmitted collectively and 
intergenerationally over time.74  This is especially true for Black people 
in the United States, who endure routine, systemic oppression and 
“chronic exposure to racism” daily.75 
Cultural trauma is birthed from monumental historical events that 
affect entire communities, such as “the enslavement of African 
Americans; the displacement, murder, and loss of culture and land of 
American Indians; the murder and torture of Jews in the Holocaust; 
war; famine; mass incarceration; and forced separation from one’s 
family.”76   It requires a collective, disruptive memory that, in turn, 
forms the group’s identity.  For Black people, that shared, disruptive 
memory is slavery.  While slavery was officially abolished in the United 
States with the passage and subsequent ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment in 1868, its memory endures through continued 
discrimination, degradation, humiliation, and oppression. 
While the vestiges of slavery and its progeny Jim Crow survive in the 
form of institutionalized racism at every level of U.S. society, the actual 
memory of slavery remains as the major force that unifies Black people 
as a racial group.77  In this way, it is the collective remembrance of 
slavery, not its experience, bolstered by slavery’s permanent legacy of 
oppression, which produces cultural trauma in the Black community.78  
Thus, Black people are doomed to coexist daily with discrimination 
 
 72. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Trauma of the Routine: Lessons on Cultural 
Trauma from the Emmett Till Verdict, 34 SOCIO. THEORY 335, 335 (2016). 
 73. Id. at 336. 
 74. See Nicole Tuchinda, The Imperative for Trauma-Responsive Special 
Education, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 766, 796 (2020). 
 75. See id. (citing Kenneth V. Hardy, Healing the Hidden Wounds of Racial 
Trauma, 22 RECLAIMING CHILD. & YOUTH 24, 25 (2013)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 72, at 339. “It [is] the remembrance or 
memory of slavery — ‘traumatic in retrospect’ . . . that serve[s] as a foundation for 
uniting the racial group.” Id. 
 78. See id. 
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and perpetually “primed for a traumatic response.”79  Research even 
suggests that continual exposure to such trauma can affect DNA 
structure, “adding a potential biological link to the mix,”80 such that 
cultural trauma “come[s] to reside in the flesh [of Black people] as 
forms of memory reactivated and articulated at moments of collective 
spectatorship.”81 
Unlike other recognized traumas, cultural trauma often assumes a 
two-tiered posture, with one model appearing as more active or 
pronounced than the other.  However, both models emerge routinely 
and are considered commonplace.  In its more latent form, cultural 
trauma does not require physical stressors to reveal itself.82  In its more 
active form, cultural trauma disrupts incessant background trauma, 
thereby augmenting the trauma narrative that Black people must 
navigate. 
i. Background Cultural Trauma 
For Black people, background cultural trauma acts as the backdrop 
to everyday life.  It manifests as a “pattern of racist events . . . across 
the life domains of minority citizens . . . [that] requires ongoing coping 
and expenditures of psychic energy.”83  “It provides a more precise 
description of the psychological consequences of interpersonal or 
institutional traumas motivated by the devaluing of one’s race,” even 
in the absence of physical contact.84  As a result of three centuries of 
slavery, succeeded by an additional one hundred years of legally 
sanctioned violence and segregation in the form of Jim Crow, Black 
people have consistently experienced racist stereotyping, wealth 
disparities, education inequities, residential segregation, police 
brutality, mass incarceration, and a host of other race-based 
 
 79. Thema Bryant-Davis & Carlota Ocampo, The Trauma of Racism: Implications 
for Counseling, Research, and Education, 33 COUNSELING PSYCH. 574, 575 (2005). 
 80. Kindaka J. Sanders, Defending the Spirit: The Right to Self-Defense Against 
Psychological Assault, 19 NEV. L.J. 227, 244 (2018). 
 81. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 72, at 336. 
 82. See Bryant-Davis, supra note 71, at 137; Robert T. Carter, Katherine Kirkinis 
& Veronica E. Johnson, Relationships Between Trauma Symptoms and Race-Based 
Traumatic Stress, 26 AM. PSYCH. ASS’N 11, 16 (2020). 
 83. Thema Bryant-Davis & Carlota Ocampo, Racist Incident-Based Trauma, 33 
COUNSELING PSYCH. 479, 483 (2005) [hereinafter Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, Racist 
Incident-Based Trauma]. 
 84. Bryant-Davis, supra note 71, at 137. 
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indignities.85  Due to the persistence of racism in the United States, 
Black people live against the backdrop of unceasing cultural trauma 
that is continually “aggravated, reinforced, and reintroduced.”86 
The aforementioned devaluing is implanted in the very fiber of our 
society in the form of deep-seated, systemic racism, which creates 
“daily minitraumas,” derived from “out-group status and de facto 
segregation such as . . . being denied promotions, home mortgages, or 
business loans; being a target of a security guard; or being stopped in 
traffic.” 87   Though appearing seemingly unrelated to race at first 
glance, these occurrences are far from racially ambiguous.  These forms 
of racism are ingrained and coincide with societal and political 
structures that preserve the status quo, such as the police.88  For Black 
people, coping with unwarranted, inexplicably incessant racism is a way 
of life.  Though incredibly painful, it is, quite simply, ordinary.  This 
type of present-day background cultural trauma slowly steeps into the 
consciousness of those who suffer it and does not possess the jolting 
suddenness that ordinarily marks trauma.89  Though it originates from 
slavery, it currently arises and resides in familiar and habitual society-, 
community-, and government-sanctioned subordination, including 
racial profiling and police brutality.90 
ii. Cultural Trauma from the Routine 
The second, more active type of cultural trauma — cultural trauma 
from the routine — suggests that even though Black people live with 
background trauma, it is possible to experience increased traumatic 
episodes triggered by that which is expected or routine.  Three 
elements must be present for cultural trauma from the routine to 
materialize: 
(1) [A]n established history or accumulation of the routine harm for 
the trauma group; (2) widespread media attention, usually based on 
preceding events, that brings regional, national, or international 
attention to the occurrence of the routine harm; and (3) public 
discourse . . . about the meaning of the routine harm, which consists 
 
 85. See Robert T. Carter et al., Racial Discrimination and Health Outcomes 
Among Racial/Ethnic Minorities: A Meta-Analytic Review, 45 J. MULTICULTURAL 
COUNSELING & DEV. 232, 232–33 (2017). 
 86. Sanders, supra note 80, at 243. 
 87. Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, Racist Incident-Based Trauma, supra note 83, at 483. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 72, at 338. 
 90. See id. at 336. 
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of public or official affirmation of the subordinated group’s marginal 
status.91 
When all three aforementioned factors converge, the ongoing, 
background cultural trauma narrative widens and works to publicly 
retraumatize the group in question such that they are reminded, by the 
exposed shame of highlighting their subordinated status, that they have 
not yet won society’s respect nor any of its attendant rights and 
privileges. 92   The cultural trauma from the routine “reignites the 
subordinated group’s consciousness of its second-class citizenship and 
punctuates its already existing distress and suffering, thereby causing 
such tensions and pains to boil over and lay a foundation for the 
development of a cultural trauma narrative.”93 
Black people face all three factors for creating cultural trauma from 
the routine.  First, the history of discrimination against Black people in 
this country is robust and well-documented, and Black people have 
learned to cope with and have come to expect discrimination.  Second, 
the killings of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and countless others at 
the hands of police have engendered incredible national media 
attention, reminding the entire country of the disregard that police 
have for Black lives.94  These police-initiated killings also prompt us to 
recall that Black people, especially men, have been regarded, 
perpetually, as violent, criminal-minded, and amoral — worthy of 
being deemed guilty without process. 95   Such stereotypes are the 
remnants of slavery.96  Third, the active movements to eliminate racism 
and bias in all its forms throughout the country, though aimed at 
alleviating oppression, simultaneously remind society of the 
subordinated position Black people hold in the United States. 97  
 
 91. Id. at 346. 
 92. See id. at 336–37. 
 93. Id. at 337. 
 94. See Laurin-Whitney Gottbrath, In 2020, The Black Lives Matter Movement 
Shook the World, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 31, 2020), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/12/31/2020-the-year-black-lives-matter-shoo
k-the-world [https://perma.cc/5LHS-32V3]. 
 95. See Robert T. Carter & Thomas D. Scheuermann, Legal and Policy Standards 
for Addressing Workplace Racism: Employer Liability and Shared Responsibility for 
Race-Based Traumatic Stress, 12 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 1, 6 
(2012). 
 96. See CalvinJohn Smiley & David Fakunle, From “Brute” to “Thug”: The 
Demonization and Criminalization of Unarmed Black Male Victims in America, 26 J. 
HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T. 350, 352 (2016). 
 97. At times, efforts to eliminate racism or the effects of racism come with failures 
that reminds us of the oppressed position that Blacks hold in the United States. See, 
e.g., Tony Norman, Tony Norman: Another Sticky Development at Allegheny County 
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George Floyd’s death disrupted the daily background cultural trauma 
that Black Americans face and thrusted it into the spotlight in a 
welcoming and highly retraumatizing way.  The cultural trauma that 
Black Americans must suffer from the routine experience of police 
brutality is more than debilitating — it is, quite simply, exhausting. 
The oppression that Black Americans face daily may be described 
as “a process of dehumanization that creates social and physical 
isolation, as well as lack of access and blocked opportunities in 
education, employment, health, and sociopolitical status.”98  Cultural 
trauma is a cognizable pain that, through targeted and deliberate 
measures, can be successfully interrupted.99  It must be noted that the 
change sought is not only for an end to police brutality — that is but 
the impetus — the change sought is an appeal for the abolishment of 
institutionalized racism.  That can begin with defunding the police as a 
part of reforming punishment as a whole.  The integrity of the entire 
criminal justice system demands such change. 
C. Rebuilding Democracy 
In addition to the harm exacted on specific individuals and 
communities of color, racial profiling and police brutality also 
“damage[] law enforcement and the criminal justice system as a whole 
by undermining public confidence and trust in the police, the courts, 
and the criminal law.”100  Mistrust in the overall system is no trivial 
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642 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
matter, as the criminal justice system is rendered impotent when 
people become unconvinced of its efficacy.101  As with all government 
systems, the criminal justice system must regard public perceptions of 
fairness and justice102 to ensure “higher levels of cooperation and lower 
rates of recidivism.”103  People are simply less compliant with, and are 
more likely to rebel against, laws they perceive as unjust or “with the 
law generally when they perceive the criminal justice system as 
tolerating such injustice.” 104   Unless the criminal justice system’s 
outcomes and processes are deemed fair, the system is of little value. 
According to scholars, “a criminal justice system derives practical 
value by generating societal perceptions of fair enforcement and 
adjudication.”105  These perceptions can be distilled into two distinct 
types: (1) legitimacy and (2) moral credibility.106  Legitimacy requires 
that criminal processes are fairly, accurately, and uniformly 
executed. 107   Moral credibility demands fairness and equitable 
outcomes.108  Legitimacy and moral credibility allow people to believe 
that the criminal justice system works and, for that reason, choose to 
behave lawfully.109  The criminal justice system simply cannot function 
effectively if the general population refuses to believe in and conform 
to its laws. 
The legitimacy theory suggests that people adapt their behavior to a 
system of criminal laws, policies, and programs because they believe 
that the process is fair.110  The perception of fair process induces a 
commitment to fully participate in the system by adjusting one’s 
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conduct to comport with the system’s requirements.111  Per legitimacy 
theory, 
citizens of a procedurally just state comport their behavior to the 
substantive dictates of the law not because the state exercises coercive 
power . . . but because they feel a normative commitment to the state. 
. . . [A]n individual . . . complies with the law not because he rationally 
calculates that it is in his best interest to do so but because he sees 
himself as a moral actor who divines that it is right to defer to 
legitimate authority.112 
Fair process, then, leads to increased compliance with and belief in the 
law.  The perception of justice does as well. 
The moral credibility aspect of fair enforcement and adjudication 
contends that “[d]oing justice may be the most effective means of 
fighting crime.”113  While legitimacy contemplates the process aspect 
of criminal justice, moral credibility ponders the punishment facet of 
criminal justice.114  Per moral credibility, the criminal justice system is 
rendered legitimate if it appeals to a community’s shared intuitions of 
justice, but succumbs to invalidity if it does not.115 
Some of the system’s power to gain compliance derives from its 
potential to stigmatize . . . .  Yet a criminal law can stigmatize only if 
it has earned moral credibility with the community it governs.  That 
is, for conviction to trigger community stigmatization, the law must 
have earned a reputation with the community for accurately reflecting 
the community’s views on what deserves moral condemnation.  A 
criminal law with liability and punishment rules that conflict with a 
community’s shared intuitions of justice will undermine its moral 
credibility.116 
As the public becomes more aware of the pervasive nature of police-
initiated violence, support for reform increases.  Several recent polls 
indicate that the American people support broad-based criminal 
justice reform.  In one 2020 poll, approximately two-thirds of a large 
sampling of Democrats and Republicans reported support for 
 
 111. See id. “People come to obey the law and cooperate with legal authorities 
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 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 216. 
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candidates who advocate criminal justice reform. 117   They also 
expressed overwhelming support for mandating body cameras, 
prohibiting no-knock warrants, and forbidding chokeholds when lethal 
force is not necessary; 88% supported mandatory investigations by the 
Department of Justice into the use of lethal force, and 82% supported 
the implementation of a national database on officer misconduct.118  
Yet another poll compared today’s attitudes concerning police 
brutality to those from five years ago.  It concluded that Americans are 
currently much more likely to agree that police violence is a serious 
problem for which police should be punished.119  Likewise, in another 
poll, 84% of Black people and 63% of white people agreed that the 
police treat Black people less favorably than white people.120  These 
statistics reveal that the time is ripe for reform.  The legitimacy and 
moral credibility models suggest that reform is absolutely necessary but 
accomplishing police reform on such a grand scale is no easy task.121  
As Part II addresses, this is, at least in part, because of the Supreme 
Court’s position regarding the reasonableness of police action. 
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II. AN UNREASONABLENESS VIEW OF POLICING 
Despite national attention to police violence, there is still a prevalent 
misconception that policing and punishment are different issues.  Much 
of this is because of the way policing has been characterized in the 
courts.  The Supreme Court analyzes excessive police force claims 
under the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
seizures.122  But the actual consequences of police force — especially 
the use of deadly force by police — are often more akin to punishment 
than a simple seizure.  While it may be that police officers have seized 
a person when they use force against them,123 confining police force 
cases to the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis has unnecessarily 
limited appropriate methods of challenging police conduct.  A closer 
look at the reasonableness standard applied to cases claiming 
unconstitutional policing reveals its extreme shortcomings. 
A. The Traditional Fourth Amendment Reasonable Force Standard 
To challenge a police officer’s use of force as excessive, a plaintiff 
must claim their seizure by police officers was unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.  In the 1989 case Graham v. Connor, the Court 
held that “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive 
force — deadly or not — in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, 
or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” 124   The 
reasonableness of police action is judged “from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of 
hindsight.”125  This “‘reasonableness’ inquiry . . . is an objective one,” 
asking “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in 
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard 
to their underlying intent or motivation.”126 
Graham reiterated the Court’s position taken five years earlier in 
Tennessee v. Garner, which considered “the constitutionality of the use 
of deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed 
suspected felon.”127  In Garner, two police officers were dispatched to 
 
 122. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 386 (1989). 
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investigate an ongoing home invasion.128  One of the officers spied the 
suspect running across the backyard of the targeted home, apparently 
leaving the scene.129  Although the officer was “reasonably sure” the 
suspect, Edward Garner, did not have a weapon, the officer still shot 
him in the back of the head as he was climbing over a fence.130  The 
officer rationalized that he felt convinced that if he did not shoot 
Garner, then Garner would have escaped. 131   Garner died at the 
hospital.132 
The Court, analyzing the claim of excessive force under the Fourth 
Amendment, held that “[deadly] force may not be used unless it is 
necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious 
physical injury to the officer or others.”133  In this particular case, the 
Court found the deadly force unreasonable because the officer did not 
have probable cause to believe that the unarmed Garner posed any 
danger to officers or the public.134  The Court explained: 
[N]otwithstanding probable cause to seize a suspect, an officer may 
not always do so by killing him.  The intrusiveness of a seizure by 
means of deadly force is unmatched.  The suspect’s fundamental 
interest in his own life need not be elaborated upon.  The use of 
deadly force also frustrates the interest of the individual, and of 
society, in judicial determination of guilt and punishment.135 
Thus, the Court recognized the narrow circumstances in which killing 
a suspect is reasonable, thereby acknowledging that when police 
officers seize someone by killing them, they rob that person and society 
of an essential part of the criminal process — judicial determination of 
guilt and punishment.  Though the Court has not recognized it, officers 
in this situation frustrate the judicial determination of guilt and 
punishment and impose on it their own. 
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In Garner, the Supreme Court further discussed the limited 
effectiveness of deadly force to accomplish criminal justice goals: 
[W]e are not convinced that the use of deadly force is a sufficiently 
productive means of accomplishing them to justify the killing of 
nonviolent suspects.  The use of deadly force is a self-defeating way 
of apprehending a suspect and so setting the criminal justice 
mechanism in motion.  If successful, it guarantees that that 
mechanism will not be set in motion.136 
Garner recognized the gravity of deadly force but failed to admit that 
the “mechanism” of criminal justice will not be set in motion when the 
police use deadly force because the intention of the officer is to impose 
punishment, rendering the mechanism unnecessary.  The Court 
reiterated this reality-blind approach to police force in Graham v. 
Connor. 
Graham v. Connor highlights the Court’s failure to recognize the 
true punishment nature of policing.  The plaintiff, Dethorne Graham, 
a Black man, suffered from Type 1 diabetes and felt the onset of an 
insulin reaction.137  He asked a friend to drive him to a convenience 
store to buy orange juice to stabilize the reaction.138  Once at the store, 
Graham went inside but quickly decided to leave after determining 
that the line was too long and asked his friend to drive him to another 
friend’s house for assistance.139  Officer Connor, also Black, observed 
Graham hurriedly leave the store, became suspicious, and pulled 
Graham over to investigate further.140  Graham and his friend tried to 
explain that Berry was experiencing a “sugar reaction,” but Officer 
Conner ordered the men to wait while he found whether anything had 
happened at the convenience store.141  While Officer Connor was in his 
patrol car calling for backup, Graham exited the car, ran around it 
twice, and then sat on the curb and passed out for a short time.142  Once 
backup arrived, the officers rolled the still unconscious Graham over 
on the sidewalk and cuffed his hands behind his back tightly.143  One of 
the officers reportedly said, “I’ve seen a lot of people with sugar 
diabetes that never acted like this.  Ain’t nothing wrong with the M.F. 
 
 136. Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted). 
 137. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 386 (1989). 
 138. See id. at 388. 
 139. See id. at 388–89. 
 140. See id. at 389. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
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but drunk.  Lock the S.B. up.”144  Several of the officers then lifted 
Graham up, carried him over to his friend’s car, and placed him face 
down on its hood.145  When Graham regained consciousness and asked 
the officers to check in his wallet for a diabetic sticker that he carried, 
an officer told him to “shut up” and shoved his face down against the 
hood of the car.146  Four officers then grabbed Graham and threw him 
headfirst into a police cruiser.147  Even when Graham’s friend brought 
some orange juice to the car, the officers refused to let him have it.148  
Eventually, after receiving a report that Graham had done nothing 
wrong at the convenience store, the officers drove him home and let 
him go.149 
Due to the police encounter, Graham suffered a broken foot, cuts 
on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an injured shoulder.150  Rather 
than viewing the police action as punishment, the Court applied the 
traditional Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. 151   The 
Supreme Court remanded the case, instructing the lower court to 
reconsider, in light of the proper Fourth Amendment standard, 
“whether the officers’ actions [we]re ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of 
the facts and circumstances confronting them.”152  What this standard 
misses is just what an Eighth Amendment punishment analysis could 
have considered: the officers’ cruelty in their treatment of Graham.  
The Supreme Court curtly dismissed the Eighth Amendment 
applicability, stating, 
[d]iffering standards under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments are 
hardly surprising: the terms “cruel” and “punishments” clearly 
suggest some inquiry into subjective state of mind, whereas the term 
“unreasonable” does not.  Moreover, the less protective Eighth 
Amendment standard applies “only after the State has complied with 
the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal 
prosecutions.”  The Fourth Amendment inquiry is one of “objective 
reasonableness” under the circumstances, and subjective concepts 
like “malice” and “sadism” have no proper place in that inquiry.153 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. at 390. 
 151. See id. at 394–95. 
 152. Id. at 397. 
 153. Id. at 398–99. 
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By focusing the analysis on objective reasonableness, the Court 
diminishes the police-individual encounter to one that depends upon 
the inconsistent views of prosecutors or jurors about what is 
appropriate.  A punishment approach to policing would allow for the 
legal standards of non-arbitrariness, proportionality, and respect for 
human dignity to have a more uniform application to police encounters 
where officers use force.  This is not to say that police punishment 
would only be deemed unconstitutional if an individual can prove that 
the officer acted with subjective malice.  However, a state’s malice and 
sadism in allowing a certain level of unjustified and excessive 
punishment should certainly be relevant factors.  By applying a 
traditional Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis to excessive 
force claims, the Court has not effectively protected the individual’s 
“fundamental interest” in their own lives.154  Instead, it employed a 
standard that leads to inconsistent, and often unjust, outcomes.  It only 
takes a survey of recent reports of killings by police officers for that 
failed protection to become apparent. 
B. The Failures of the Reasonableness Standard 
The death penalty on the streets155 — when police officers kill an 
individual as punishment for that person’s objectionable behavior — 
operates outside of the criminal justice system’s procedural safeguards.  
Between 2005 and 2015, police officers fatally shot around 1,000 people 
each year, but only 54 officers faced criminal charges.156  Judging police 
 
 154. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). 
 155. For further explanation of the concept of deadly police force being the death 
penalty on the streets, see Jefferson Exum, Death Penalty on the Streets, supra note 
24. See also TEDx Talks, The Death Penalty on the Street, YOUTUBE (Oct. 10, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sq7eAEjJm6U [https://perma.cc/AQP7-VAHE]. 
 156. See Matt Ferner & Nick Wing, Here’s How Many Cops Got Convicted of 
Murder Last Year for On-Duty Shootings, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 13, 2016, 11:34 
AM), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/police-shooting-convictions_n_5695968ce4b086bc1cd
5d0da [https://perma.cc/29RN-3AX3]; Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands 
Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-pros
ecuted/ [https://perma.cc/S5CB-EAUX]. Parenthetically, many of these cases result in 
expensive settlements of wrongful death claims. See, e.g., Nick Wing, We Pay a 
Shocking Amount for Police Misconduct, and Cops Want Us to Accept It. We 
Shouldn’t, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2015, 7:39 AM), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/police-misconduct-settlements_n_7423386 
[https://perma.cc/ML27-RD7M]. For a specific example of the rate of deadly police 
force compared to convictions, see Eric Levenson, What Georgia Law Says About 
When Police Can Use Deadly Force, CNN (June 15, 2020, 3:22 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/15/us/rayshard-brooks-force-law/index.html 
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use of force by its reasonableness, which is informed by police officers’ 
discretionary judgment, has contributed to an unjust system.  This is 
especially true for those who have lost their lives in police encounters 
when the use of non-fatal police tactics could have safely avoided that 
loss of life.  The tragedies of Breonna Taylor, Michael Brown, and 
other unarmed individuals killed by police officers who went 
unpunished for their actions demonstrate the incompleteness of the 
reasonableness standard. 
i. Breonna Taylor 
On March 13, 2020, in Louisville, Kentucky, police killed Breonna 
Taylor, a 26-year Black woman, in her home. 157   Breonna, an 
emergency room technician, was asleep in her bed when she and her 
boyfriend were roused by a loud knocking on their apartment door at 
12:40 AM.158  She was killed by at least five of the more than 20 bullets 
fired by three white, plainclothes police officers who used a battering 
ram to force entry into her home pursuant to a no-knock warrant.159  
The Kentucky Attorney General did not present any charges for her 
death to the grand jury despite nationwide calls for 
#JusticeForBreonna.160 
According to Breonna’s boyfriend, Kenneth Walker, he and 
Breonna were in bed sleeping when they were startled awake by loud 
 
[https://perma.cc/MT5K-NQUK] (“From 2015 to 2020, police in Georgia have shot and 
killed 182 people, according to The Washington Post’s Fatal Force tracker. In that 
time, only one Georgia officer has been charged with murder.”). 
 157. See Arian Campo-Flores & Sabrina Siddiqui, Police Killing of Breonna Taylor 
Fuels Calls to End No-Knock Warrants, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2020, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/police-killing-of-breonna-taylor-fuels-calls-to-end-no-kn
ock-warrants-11590332400 [https://perma.cc/7EE7-D9B7]. Black women are victims of 
varying forms of police brutality, including fatal shootings, rape, and maiming. See 
Mary-Elizabeth Murphy, Black Women Are the Victims of Police Violence, Too, 
WASH. POST (July 24, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/24/police-violence-happens-against
-women-too/ [https://perma.cc/M8EK-6TMX]. See generally KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW ET 
AL., SAY HER NAME: RESISTING POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK WOMEN (2016). 
 158. See Tessa Duvall, Fact Check 2.0: Debunking 9 Widely Shared Rumors in the 
Breonna Taylor Police Shooting, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Jan. 8, 2021, 7:38 PM), 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/crime/2020/06/16/breonna-taylor-fact-che
ck-7-rumors-wrong/5326938002/ [https://perma.cc/NVJ6-7KSX]. 
 159. See id.; Richard A. Oppel Jr., Derrick Bryson Taylor & Nicholas 
Bogel-Burroughs, What to Know About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html 
[https://perma.cc/D849-4JH7]. 
 160. See Duvall, supra note 158. 
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banging at the door.161  They called out to ask who was at the door but 
only received more loud banging in response.162  Frightened that an 
assailant was trying to break into the home, Kenneth grabbed his 
legally registered handgun, and he and Breonna began walking slowly 
toward the door.163  Just as the couple emerged from the bedroom, 
officers barged into the apartment, knocking the door off its hinges 
with a battering ram.164  Frightened and unable to see who was there 
in the dark, Kenneth fired a warning shot toward the floor.165  While 
initial reports of the event stated that the shot struck one of the officers, 
Sergeant Jonathan Mattingly, in the thigh, the Kentucky State ballistics 
report casted doubt on it being Kenneth who shot Sergeant 
Mattingly.166  What is undisputed, however, is that the four officers on 
the scene opened fire immediately following Kenneth’s warning 
shot.167  One of the officers, Detective Brett Hankison, went outside, 
behind the apartment building, and blindly shot ten rounds into the 
apartment through a window with drawn blinds.168  An ambulance was 
called to the scene to render aid to Sergeant Mattingly, but Breonna 
was left coughing and struggling to breathe on the floor of her home 
for nearly five minutes before emergency aid was sent to her 
location.169  And this was only after Kenneth, still unaware that it was 
the police who were in the apartment, called 911 and cried, “I don’t 
know what’s happening.  Somebody kicked in the door and shot my 
girlfriend.”170  Aid did not arrive for Breonna for more than 20 minutes 
 
 161. See The Daily, The Killing of Breonna Taylor, Part 2, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 
2020) [hereinafter New York Times Podcast, Part 2], 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/10/podcasts/the-daily/Breonna-Taylor.html 
[https://perma.cc/GN3F-CD56]; Oppel Jr. et al., supra note 159. 
 162. See New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161; Oppel Jr. et al., supra 
note 159. 
 163. See New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161; Oppel Jr. et al., supra 
note 159. 
 164. See New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161; Oppel Jr. et al., supra 
note 159. 
 165. See Andrew Wolfson, Ballistics Report Doesn’t Support Kentucky AG’s Claim 
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 167. See New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161; Oppel Jr. et al., supra 
note 159. 
 168. See New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161; Oppel Jr. et al., supra 
note 159. 
 169. See Oppel Jr. et al., supra note 159. 
 170. New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161. 
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after the officers’ bullets struck her.171  Breonna was already deceased 
by that time.172  Police never found drugs in her apartment.173 
The outcome in Breonna’s case lets us know that in the U.S. policing 
system, it is considered reasonable for the police to kill someone in 
their own home when all they are doing is peacefully sleeping.  Though 
the underlying facts leading up to Breonna’s death are contested, the 
Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD) claimed it believed a 
former boyfriend of Breonna had used her apartment to receive 
packages of illegal drugs.174  Breonna was no longer in a relationship 
with that man, but officers were able to procure a warrant to search her 
apartment, which she shared with her sister and niece (who were not at 
home that night).175  LMPD had initially procured a no-knock warrant 
to enter the home, but those orders had been changed before the raid 
to require the officers to knock and announce their presence when they 
executed the warrant.176  Either way, the officers claimed they knocked 
and announced their presence several times before forcibly opening 
the door when they received no response.177  However, Kenneth and 
several others who lived in the apartment building said the police never 
announced themselves.178 
Breonna Taylor’s tragic killing received national attention during 
the summer 2020 protests.179  The troubling details about the night she 
was killed raised serious questions about the truthfulness of the officers 
involved and the trustworthiness of the system that has supported and 
protected them.  For instance, the officers’ incident report chronicling 
that night contained multiple inaccuracies.  It listed that Breonna had 
no injuries, even though she had been shot several times and died on 
the scene.180  The report indicated the officers had not forced their way 
into the apartment despite using a battering ram to break Breonna’s 
 
 171. See Oppel Jr. et al., supra note 159. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. 
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 175. For a thorough account of the situation, see New York Times Podcast, Part 2, 
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note 159. 
 179. See Oppel Jr. et al., supra note 159. 
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door down.181  There was no body camera footage from the shooting 
despite it occurring during an organized, pre-planned raid.182 
Some have questioned why the officers received a warrant in the first 
place, especially since the police had already located the main suspect 
elsewhere by the time of the raid.  And, of course, many had questioned 
why officers would choose to raid in the middle of the night when they 
apparently thought that Breonna lived alone at her apartment and did 
not suspect her of a violent crime.183  Despite all of these questions, a 
jury will not have the opportunity to weigh the credibility of the 
officers’ story in a criminal trial. 
In September 2020 — six months after Breonna was killed and three 
months after protests erupted throughout the country decrying police 
violence against Black people — a Kentucky grand jury indicted 
Hankison on three counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree 
for “conduct which creates a substantial danger of death or serious 
physical injury to another person . . . under circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 184  The charges were 
not for killing Breonna but for the shots he fired that tore through 
Breonna’s apartment walls and entered a neighboring apartment, 
endangering the three people within that apartment. 185   Those 
individuals were not shot.186  So, instead of any officers facing charges 
for their actions that led to Breonna’s death, only one officer faces a 
Class D felony, carrying a sentence of only up to five years in prison, 
for shots that did not kill anyone.187 
In an unprecedented move, a concerned grand juror filed a court 
motion requesting that the transcripts of the grand jury proceedings be 
released to the public,188 accusing Kentucky Attorney General Daniel 
Cameron of using the grand jurors “as a shield to deflect accountability 
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and responsibility.”189  On October 2, 2020, approximately 15 hours of 
the grand jury proceeding audio recordings were released,190 but they 
left more questions about the reasonableness of the officers’ actions, 
and the raid in general, than answers.  Though social commentary 
focused on whether officers were reasonable in opening fire once 
Kenneth shot Sergeant Mattingly, grand jurors were concerned about 
the beginning of the story.  They raised several questions about 
whether Kenneth had been named in the search warrant (he was not) 
and what exactly the officers saw when they entered the apartment.191  
They also asked whether the officers involved were aware that the 
main suspect had already been apprehended.192  The jurors wanted to 
know if the police had recovered drugs or money from the apartment 
and were told they had not.193  In fact, they were informed that the 
police had not even searched the apartment for drugs during that 
raid.194  The grand jurors asked whether there were diagrams of the 
scene and were told that there were none.195  They asked why the 
officers’ body cameras were not recording and were told by the 
questioned detective he did not know.196  Grand jurors heard from at 
least two police officers involved that they knocked and announced 
their presence multiple times before forcing their way into the 
apartment.197  However, it does not appear that grand jurors heard 
from Breonna’s neighbors, though nearly a dozen of those neighbors 
have said they heard loud banging but never heard officers identify 
themselves as police.198  Apparently, jurors were uncomfortable with 
how the raid unfolded from the very beginning.  There were instances 
when the jurors seemed dubious of the videos and photographs they 
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were being shown.199  With all of these questions, what would have 
been very illuminating would be knowing how the jury was instructed 
on the applicable law.  However, that information — which should 
have included some instructions on reasonableness — was not included 
in the released portions of the proceedings. 
The tapes provide no clarity on how Cameron instructed the grand 
jurors to consider the other officers’ actions.  The released portions of 
the grand jury audio do not include any statements or 
recommendations from the prosecutors on which charges they believe 
should be levied against the officers.200  In fact, Cameron has said that 
the jurors were told the two officers whose shots likely killed Breonna 
were justified in their actions.201   The argument that those officers 
acted reasonably is that they returned fire only after Kenneth fired 
upon them, even though individuals are legally empowered to use a 
firearm to protect their home from intruders. 
Ultimately, both the grand jury and a trial jury were robbed of the 
opportunity to actually consider the reasonableness of the other 
officers’ actions in light of all of the circumstances of that night.  In an 
unusual decision, a Kentucky judge allowed grand jurors in Breonna’s 
case to speak publicly about the proceedings, ruling that such 
disclosure was in “the interest of all citizens to have confidence in the 
integrity of the justice system.”202  The two grand jurors who chose to 
make statements reported that prosecutors did not take their questions 
 
 199. See New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161. 
 200. See id. (stating the complaining grand juror said that Cameron was deflecting 
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seriously and there was an “uproar” when the grand jurors realized the 
police officers would not be charged with Breonna Taylor’s death.203  
As Grand Juror #1 stated, “[w]as justice . . . done?  No, I feel that there 
was . . . quite a bit more that could have been done or should have been 
presented for us to deliberate on.”204  Despite this injustice, even if the 
grand jurors had been given the answers they sought and had been 
instructed appropriately, it is questionable whether the reasonableness 
standard would have led to justice for Breonna. 
ii. Michael Brown 
As previously explained, traditionally, in use of force cases, 
reasonableness is the default conclusion, even when the individual 
killed is unarmed and even when that individual was committing either 
no criminal offense, or an extremely minor one. 205   The story of 
Michael Brown further illustrates the consequences of a traditional 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.  On August 9, 2014, 
Officer Darren Wilson shot and killed 18-year-old Michael Brown — 
an unarmed Black male — in Ferguson, Missouri.206  Though in the 
weeks following the shooting, it was alleged that Michael had robbed a 
convenience store just before his encounter with Officer Wilson, Police 
Chief Tom Jackson reported after the shooting that Officer Wilson was 
not aware of the alleged robbery. 207   Rather, Officer Wilson first 
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approached Michael for standing in the street and impeding traffic.208  
A number of witness accounts stated that Michael had his hands up in 
surrender when Officer Wilson fatally shot him.209  Others claimed that 
just before Officer Wilson shot him, Michael wrestled Officer Wilson 
for his gun, ran away, and then came charging back at him in a rage.210 
Officer Wilson’s reasonability was never determined by a judge 
because no criminal charges were ever filed.  However, the 
reasonableness analysis is embedded in the Missouri law presented to 
a St. Louis County grand jury which decided not to indict the officer.211  
Missouri Revised Statute Section 563.046 allows a law enforcement 
officer to use deadly force to effect the arrest or prevent the escape of 
a criminal suspect “[w]hen the officer reasonably believes that such use 
of deadly force is immediately necessary to effect the arrest . . . and also 
reasonably believes that the person to be arrested . . . [h]as committed 
or attempted to commit a felony.”212  The statute conflicts with the 
Supreme Court’s directive on the use of deadly force in Tennessee v. 
Garner.213  Therefore, the State of Missouri allows police officers to 
use deadly force to carry out an arrest or prevent a suspect’s escape 
only when that officer “reasonably believes” that the suspect is 
attempting to flee using a deadly weapon or that the suspect “may 
endanger life or inflict serious physical injury unless arrested without 
delay.”214 
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The problem in the Darren Wilson case is that prosecutors gave the 
jurors both statements of the law at different times in the process.215  In 
either iteration of the law, however, the reasonableness standard was 
present.  Given the erroneous instruction, the confusion for the jury 
would have been with what Officer Wilson was required to reasonably 
believe — that deadly force was necessary to conduct the arrest of 
Michael, or that Michael was a threat to the officer or the public if 
Officer Wilson did not contain him.  The grand jury was never asked 
whether Officer Wilson followed non-fatal encounter procedures 
before resorting to deadly force.  This is, of course, because the law 
does not require such an inquiry.  There is no consensus in the courts 
of law or public opinion on what constitutes reasonable force by a 
police officer.  This disagreement regarding the reasonableness of 
Officer Wilson’s actions sparked a national “Hands Up” movement 
against police violence that garnered international attention.216  The 
phenomenon #BlackLivesMatter became not just a trending hashtag 
but a movement calling for a focus on human value in the police use of 
force debate.217  On the other side of the wide divide was significant 
support for Officer Wilson in online support groups and donations of 
over $100,000 raised for him and his family.218  This stark division is 
evidence of the reasonableness standard’s inadequacy. 
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s-moment-ignited-movement [https://perma.cc/H9VE-VPT2]; HANDSUPUNITED, 
http://www.handsupunited.org [https://perma.cc/7EPU-GED9] (last visited Oct. 2, 
2015). 
 217. See BLM Demands, BLACK LIVES MATTER, 
https://blacklivesmatter.com/blm-demands/ [https://perma.cc/88TZ-CJGB] (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2021). 
 218. See Paige Lavender, ‘Support Officer Darren Wilson’ GoFundMe Raises over 
$137,000 for Cop Who Shot Michael Brown, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 21, 2014, 2:08 
PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/21/darren-wilsongofundme_n_5698013.html 
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iii. Amadou Diallo 
Another famous case of a controversial police shooting is that of 
Amadou Diallo, who was killed by four New York City police officers 
in 1999.219  Amadou was a 22-year-old West African immigrant with no 
criminal record. 220   The officers, who were in unmarked cars and 
dressed in street clothes, came upon Amadou as he stood unarmed at 
his apartment building entrance.221  The officers testified that Amadou 
was acting suspiciously and that he did not yield to their commands to 
stop but instead ran inside the building when they approached. 222  
Amadou was running into his own home.  The officers claimed that 
they began firing upon him because they thought he was reaching for a 
gun.223  Amadou was unarmed and reaching for his wallet.  Officers 
fired 41 shots at him, and 19 of those hit him.224  All of the officers 
involved in the shooting were charged with homicide then acquitted,225 
leaving many confused as to how a jury truly could have found the 
officers’ actions to be reasonable.  Despite the officers’ claim of a 
mistaken belief that Amadou was reaching for a gun, 41 shots fired for 
a gun that was never seen can certainly be considered an unreasonable 
response. 
iv. Aaron Campbell 
The January 29, 2010, police shooting of 25-year-old Aaron 
Campbell in Portland, Oregon, ended in three conflicting results: (1) a 
grand jury declining to indict the officers, (2) internal discipline of the 
officers, and (3) a civil rights suit victory for Aaron’s family.226   In 
Aaron’s case, police were called to check on the welfare of a suicidal, 
 
 219. See Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo 
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 220. See id. 
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 224. See id. 
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 226. See $1.2M Settlement in Campbell Police Shooting, KGW PORTLAND (Feb. 2, 
2012, 5:38 AM) [hereinafter $1.2M Settlement], 
https://www.kgw.com/article/news/12m-settlement-in-campbell-police-shooting/283-4
14042077 [https://perma.cc/F7HV-UCXA]; Aaron Campbell, POLICE BUREAU, CITY 
OF PORTLAND, https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/538235 
[https://perma.cc/V878-RKGC] (last visited Feb. 7, 2021). 
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armed man.227  In what has become a familiar scene in these fatal police 
force stories, officers claimed they believed Aaron was reaching for a 
gun when Officer Ron Frashour shot him, 228  but Aaron was 
unarmed.229 
After declining to indict the officers, the grand jury members 
released a three-page letter to the District Attorney indicating their 
outrage with Officer Frashour’s actions.230  The grand jury members 
wrote: 
[W]e the grand jury determined that we could not indict Officer Ron 
Frashour on any criminal charge.  That is not to say that we found him 
innocent, agreed with his decisions, or found that the police incident 
at Sandy Terrace was without flaw.  What we found was that Officer 
Frashour’s actions were consistent with the relevant laws and statutes 
regarding the use of deadly force by a police officer.231 
According to the grand jurors’ letter, the police incident involved 
“flawed police policies, incomplete or inappropriate training, 
incomplete communication, and other issues with the police effort.”232  
The grand jury understood that the law allowing an officer to kill an 
individual if the officer “believed he or his fellow officers were in 
imminent danger” prohibited them from indicting Officer Frashour for 
killing Aaron, though they believed that “Aaron Campbell should not 
have died that day.”233 
The prevailing opinion amongst the grand jurors was that the officer 
did not act appropriately, yet because the reasonableness standard only 
focuses on the officer’s belief, the result was no criminal liability.  The 
internal discipline and civil award in Aaron’s case also suggests 
faultiness in the traditional reasonableness approach to the use of force 
by police officers.  An internal investigation by the Portland Police 
Department found that “it was not reasonable for Officer Frashour to 
believe that Aaron Campbell posed an immediate threat of death or 
serious physical injury, which is what bureau policy and training 
 
 227. See Aaron Campbell, supra note 226. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See $1.2M Settlement, supra note 226. 
 230. See Letter from Multnomah Cnty. Grand Jury to Michael D. Schrunk, Dist. 
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 231. Id. at 1. 
 232. Id. 
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requires.”234  According to that investigation, “Campbell did not come 
out of the apartment with a weapon drawn or in view.  His hands were 
clasped together on top of his head and remained there.  He walked 
backward toward officers and followed commands to stop, walk slowly, 
and stop again.”235  All of this showed that, contrary to the grand jury 
conclusion, Officer Frashour’s decision to kill Campbell was not based 
on a reasonable perception of a deadly threat, but instead on the officer 
being “so focused on his perception of Campbell as a threat with a gun” 
that he failed to follow proper use of force protocol instituted by his 
department.236  The department report relayed several alternatives to 
deadly force that could have — and apparently should have — been 
used by the officer in this particular situation.237 
As a result of the report, Portland’s Mayor and Police Chief decided 
to fire Officer Frashour and suspend three other officers involved in 
the incident.238  The Mayor’s view of the incident led to the City of 
Portland agreeing to pay $1.2 million to Campbell’s family to settle a 
civil rights suit.239  These examples of results that are inconsistent with 
the criminal cases show that — outside of the criminal context — 
decision-makers find fault with the actions of police officers in these 
situations.240  This disconnect with the criminal justice system reveals 
the shortcomings of the traditional reasonableness standard to reflect 
sentiments about what justice requires.  Police force cases should be 
considered as more than simply a Fourth Amendment seizure that can 
 
 234. PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU, INTERNAL INVESTIGATION: AARON MARCELL 
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be handled with the traditional, officer point-of-view-focused 
reasonableness analysis.  That standard fails to capture the full harm 
inflicted on individuals, families, and communities when police use 
extreme levels of force against individuals.  This is especially true given 
the racist roots of policing, the racial trauma it inflicts, and the view of 
Black criminality that it perpetuates. 
III. POLICING AS PUNISHMENT 
The true consequences of police force — that individuals are 
penalized or executed for their perceived objectionable responses to a 
police encounter — demonstrate it is more akin to punishment than 
seizure.  Rather than an unsatisfactory reasonableness analysis, the 
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment death penalty analysis should 
govern.  The same respect for human life that fuels the protections and 
guarantees given in the death penalty context can be incorporated into 
the reasonableness standard that now governs excessive force claims. 
A. The Eighth Amendment and Human Dignity 
In interpreting the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause, the Supreme Court has expressed the importance 
of human dignity241 and that “the fundamental premise of the [Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment] Clause [is] that even the vilest criminal 
remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.”242  The 
Court’s treatment of the death penalty provides a strong example of 
how the Supreme Court centers its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
on human dignity.  In keeping with this concern, the Supreme Court 
has developed several limits on when the death penalty can be imposed 
through the court system.  For instance, the death penalty must be 
proportionate to the crime of conviction, and death cannot be a 
mandatory punishment.243 
Proportionality between the crime committed and the punishment 
imposed is one bedrock protection that the Supreme Court has read 
into the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.244  The Court deems 
punishment unconstitutionally excessive if it is “grossly out of 
 
 241. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (“A punishment is ‘cruel and 
unusual,’ therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.”). 
 242. Id. at 273. 
 243. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 154 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280, 280–81 (1976). 
 244. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 154. 
2021] THAT IS ENOUGH PUNISHMENT 663 
proportion to the severity of the crime,”245 and has described the death 
penalty as “unique in its severity and irrevocability.”246  Due to this 
severity, the Court has limited the death penalty to “those offenders 
who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose 
extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”247  
For this reason, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to uphold 
the death penalty in situations where the defendant did not 
intentionally cause the death of another human.248 
The Supreme Court has also shown respect for human dignity in the 
death penalty context by invalidating statutes that make death a 
mandatory penalty.  In the 1976 case Woodson v. North Carolina, the 
Supreme Court explored the country’s history of moving away from 
the mandatory imposition of such a final and severe sentence.249  The 
Court quoted Chief Justice Warren Burger’s dissent in Furman v. 
Georgia,250 in which he said that the change from mandatory death 
sentences “was greeted by the Court as a humanizing development.”251  
As the Court elegantly stated, 
process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character 
and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the 
particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate 
punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating 
factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.  It treats all 
persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual 
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to 
be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.252 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that just punishment sees 
people as individuals with value beyond their punishable actions.  By 
allowing each defendant to be seen as a unique individual, possibly 
worthy of compassion, death penalty jurisprudence incorporates 
respect for human dignity into even the most severe and final sentence.  
 
 245. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
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The traditional Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard misses 
what the Eight Amendment captures — a concern for the human who 
is subject to police violence.  Unfortunately, by limiting the Eighth 
Amendment to post-conviction punishment, the Supreme Court has 
foreclosed a victim of police violence from the human dignity 
protection that the Eight Amendment could provide. 
B. Why the Eighth Amendment Should Apply to Policing 
Although the Eighth Amendment purports to protect people from 
cruel treatment by state actors, the Supreme Court limits the Eighth 
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to post-conviction 
punishment.  In Ingraham v. Wright,253 where parents challenged the 
constitutionality of corporal punishment in schools, the Court narrowly 
held that the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment was inapplicable to the corporal punishment of 
public school children.254 
The Court’s analysis discussed the Eighth Amendment’s history, 
noting that its text covers topics associated with the criminal process, 
such as bails, fines, and punishment. 255   The Court reasoned that 
because “the text of the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the 
power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of 
government,” it was not meant to apply to sanctions unrelated to the 
criminal process, such as schoolchildren’s discipline.256 
Unlike corporal punishment in public schools, police investigation 
into criminal behavior is the starting point of the “criminal law 
function” of government.257  The Supreme Court’s recognition of such 
force as a Fourth Amendment seizure supports this view.  A seizure 
occurs when, due to police actions and the circumstances at the scene, 
“a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
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leave.”258  The circumstances that might indicate a seizure are “the 
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an 
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use 
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 
officer’s request might be compelled.”259 
By adopting the Ingraham view of the Eighth Amendment in police 
force cases, the Supreme Court diminished its rationale that the Eighth 
Amendment was inapplicable.  The Ingraham Court’s observations 
that corporal punishment against students is not Eighth Amendment 
punishment reveals the Graham Court’s blunder in concluding that 
Ingraham prohibits the Eighth Amendment’s applicability to police 
force. 
When a seizure occurs, it must be justified either by reasonable 
suspicion (for investigatory stops) or probable cause (for seizures 
amounting to the restrictiveness of an arrest).260  The definitions of 
both reasonable suspicion and probable cause indicate a required 
connection between the seizure and criminal activity.  Reasonable 
suspicion requires an officer to have articulable facts, “which lead[] him 
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity 
may be afoot.”261   Likewise, probable cause for an arrest requires 
officers to have “reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient to 
warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed 
or was committing an offense.”262  Thus, when officers seize a person 
using force — a seizure that requires some level of suspicion of criminal 
activity — there is a clear connection to the criminal process, a 
connection missing from corporal punishment in school. 
Law enforcement officials’ use of force to carry out criminal law 
investigatory power is a form of punishment.  Criminal punishment is 
imposed upon a person as a response to that person’s objectionable 
behavior — the violation of a particular jurisdiction’s criminal statutes.  
Punishment is inflicted to deter criminal behavior, rehabilitate the 
criminal offender, incapacitate dangerous individuals, or express 
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666 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
society’s desire for retribution against the lawbreaker.263  When law 
enforcement officials seize individuals, it is because of some perceived 
criminal violation committed by that individual (which may or may not 
be a pretextual reason). 
It is that perception of objectionable behavior — probable cause — 
that legally justifies seizure under the Fourth Amendment.264   This 
means that an officer — or a magistrate in cases where a warrant is 
required — must determine a “fair probability” that the individual has 
committed a criminal offense before the arrest can be made.265  In the 
case of Michael Brown, the alleged criminal offense was impeding 
traffic.  And while Officer Wilson may have initially only needed 
reasonable suspicion to stop Michael from inquiring further, once 
deadly force was used, Michael’s seizure was elevated to an arrest, 
which would require probable cause that he had committed an 
offense.266  According to Officer Wilson, when deadly force was used, 
Michael’s objectionable behavior threatened Officer Wilson’s life, 
which could be categorized as a host of criminal offenses — from 
assault to attempted murder.267  Thus, the deadly force used against 
Michael was in response to his perceived criminal behavior.  In Officer 
Wilson’s version of the story, lethal force was meant to deter Michael’s 
life-threatening advance,268 depicting Michael as an enraged monster 
untamable by any amount of negotiation. 269   The shots that took 
Michael’s life were certainly meant to incapacitate him.270   Officer 
Wilson’s actions could only be justified by a belief that Michael’s 
allegedly outrageously threatening behavior deserved retribution271 or 
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that rehabilitation would be futile. 272   Officer Wilson subjected 
Michael to a level of force that operated in the same manner as 
punishment, the same rationale evident in Breonna Taylor’s case. 
Rather than initiating the mechanism of criminal justice to 
rehabilitate or punish someone engaged in a drug crime by collecting 
evidence, bringing charges, and duly convicting that person, the police 
who entered Breonna’s home acted as though they had already 
determined the guilt of everyone in that apartment.273  Officers killed 
her when attempting to punish whomever fired at them, justified 
because they were threatened with deadly force, despite the fact that a 
person has the right to defend their home from intruders.274  Their 
shots were intended to deter and incapacitate.  And the fact that even 
before medical aid was rendered to Breonna, Kenneth was arrested for 
shooting at officers shows that officers viewed him as worthy of 
retribution.  Rather than depending on a flimsy assessment of 
reasonableness, courts and the public should instead view certain 
aspects of policing as a form of control and punishment — especially 
over Black bodies. 
IV. REFORMING POLICING IS REFORMING PUNISHMENT 
Viewing the use of force by police officers as a form of punishment 
borrows valuable lessons from the sentencing reform movement and 
theories of punishment.  The goals of federal punishment are expressed 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which melds utilitarian and retributivist 
theories.275  This hybrid approach purports to punish offenders for a 
larger societal benefit and justly penalize moral blameworthiness.276  
Among the governing principles of punishment enumerated in the 
statute are deterrence of specific offenders, incapacitation, crime 
prevention, distribution of just punishment, and effective offender 
 
 272. Officer Wilson testified before the grand jury that as he fired a flurry of shots 
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rehabilitation.277  Utilitarian and retributivist theories of punishment 
differ in their punishment goals. 278   The utilitarian theory of 
punishment aims to prevent or reduce future crime, while that of 
retribution is to ensure the offenders receive their “just desert.”279  
Police-initiated punishment satisfies neither the goal of crime 
prevention nor the “eye for an eye” value. 
While yet unfinished, inestimable work has been produced in the 
sentencing reform arena that may prove instructive in reimagining the 
police.280  In some circles, sentencing reform scholars have relied upon 
retributive theories of punishment to urge the dismantling of the 
current sentencing scheme in the United States.281  Others rely upon 
deterrence,282 arguing that since it is punishment, police force should 
be informed by the proportionality requirements of retributive 
punishment and the crime prevention mandates of deterrence. 
The utilitarian principle of deterrence is rooted in the proposition 
that punishment is necessary for society’s general protection. 283  
General deterrence hopes that the public crime prevention message 
invoked at sentencing will remain the same throughout the sentence, 
thus deterring others from committing crimes.284  Specific deterrence 
posits that personalized punishment is necessary to prohibit future 
crimes of the offender.285  Deterrence’s goals are not realized in any 
way when punishment is police initiated. 
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The concept of retribution insists that offenders be punished fairly, 
based solely on the extent of their moral blameworthiness. 286  
Retribution’s core justification is proportionality — that punishment 
will always be proportional to desert and, therefore, fair.287  Desert falls 
into two separate, yet coincidental, categories: desert pragmatism and 
desert moralism.288  Desert pragmatism, or empirical desert, adopts the 
“community’s shared principles of justice” in assigning liability and, 
ultimately, punishment.289  Desert moralism, or deontological desert, 
relies upon “abstract principles of moral right and goodness.”290  These 
“bottom-up” and “top-down” theories, respectively, are intended to 
work collaboratively to ensure overall justice so that “each offender 
receives the punishment deserved, no more, no less.” 291   Viewing 
police force as punishment begs the question of whether it was 
apportioned fairly. 
Proportionality is the cornerstone of retributive punishment 
theory.292  It may be viewed as a “basic right” and a “fundamental 
principle of justice that emanates directly from the state’s essential 
duty to protect the personal right[s] of its constituents.”293   In the 
context of criminal sentencing, proportionality requires a critical 
assessment of the degree of an offender’s moral blameworthiness, 
succeeded by a reckoning of whether any proposed sentence is aligned 
therewith. 294   Modern egalitarian interpretations maintain that 
retributive punishment must value offender and victim dignity by 
determining the outer limits of punishment and constraining 
punishment to the “precise amount of suffering necessary to restore a 
just distribution of the burdens of the law.”295  Scholars suggest that 
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proportionality must be assessed qualitatively and quantitatively, but 
its qualitative nature is more reliable.296  Just as “it is difficult to know 
or control which particular details of an offender or offense inform a 
decision-maker’s assessment of desert,”297 it is also nearly impossible 
to measure how much punishment is enough. 298   Nevertheless, 
quantitative proportionality cannot be disregarded. 
A. Retribution and Quantitative Proportionality 
The retributive theory of punishment is grounded in perceptions of 
punishment as fair, which may include the moral philosopher’s 
perceptions and those of the community.  Scholars agree that desert is 
only effective if the general population is convinced of its fairness and 
proportionality.299  For desert to function fairly, proportionality must 
be measurable — retribution requires punishment no more and no less 
than what is deserved, “solely because the offender deserves it.”300  
Individual assessments are required for a punishment to survive 
retribution scrutiny. 
Per retributive justice theory, once an offender no longer poses a 
threat to society, general deterrence considerations are no longer 
justified.  But the reality is that “[t]he majority of offenses do not, in 
society’s opinion, merit sentences as harsh as the death penalty or even 
life in prison,” and result in the imposition of “much stiffer penalties 
 
 296. See id. at 1327. 
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than were originally deemed appropriate by the legislature.”301  This 
rings true in the case of unreasonable police force, specifically deadly 
force. 
Quantitative proportionality analysis focuses on time, asking 
whether the punishment is a sufficient duration.  Per empirical desert, 
intuitions of justice and fairness do not align with the conversion of an 
encounter with police into a life sentence.  Some scholars suggest that 
retribution can only be accurately measured by factoring in conditions 
that exist when the crime was committed.302  In this way, retribution 
requires that the punishment accurately and only fits the crime.  
Current policing practices and the law used to sustain them support a 
quantitatively disproportionate punishment scheme.  Retribution can 
be better understood, however, by focusing on its qualitative elements.  
An examination of Eighth Amendment proportionality is instructive 
in this area. 
B. Retribution, the Eighth Amendment, and                             
Qualitative Proportionality 
The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment has been interpreted to proscribe excessive or 
disproportionate punishments. 303   While retribution’s definition is 
well-established, considerable scholarly commentary notes the 
Supreme Court’s inability to craft a concrete interpretation of Eighth 
Amendment proportionality.304   In response, some scholars suggest 
that Eighth Amendment proportionality is born of retributive 
proportionality and that the essential meanings of both are identical.305  
Professor John Stinneford suggested that the Court’s confusion 
regarding Eighth Amendment proportionality can be remedied by 
looking to retributive proportionality 306  and acknowledging the 
distinction between punishment’s justification and purpose. 307  
Punishment’s justification “gives the punishment the quality of justice” 
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or “ensures that the offender gets his due.”308  At the same time, its 
purposes “are the good things we hope to achieve through it, without 
respect to what is due to the offender as a matter of justice.”309  Under 
this reasoning, “a punishment is permissible only to the extent that it is 
justified” but is disproportionate and, therefore, excessive if it exceeds 
the “bounds of justice.”310 
The assessment of whether punishment is within bounds and 
appropriately proportionate should focus on the qualitative311 dignity 
interests inherent in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Dignity 
interests speak directly to the type of punishment imposed — in other 
words, the qualitative character from the punishment.312 
When an offender is incarcerated after being adjudged guilty, 
qualitative proportionality review does not focus on time served but 
seeks to identify whether inmates’ experiences of confinement are 
proportional to “the crime committed, the culpability of the offender, 
or both.”313  Qualitative proportionality, then, pertains to the means 
and conditions of punishment and does not contemplate the duration, 
but the manner in which one is punished. 314   A requirement that 
conditions of punishment must not offend human dignity315 limits the 
government’s power to punish.316 
Certainly, police brutality offends human dignity: 
Police use of force should include base levels of verbal and physical 
restraint, non-lethal force, and lethal force; yet, instead, they are 
permitted and trained to use deadly or lethal force, including shooting 
and chokeholds, under said “justifiable” circumstances.  Moreover, 
regardless of the official or unofficial restrictions and controversies 
on the use of lethal force, a police officer might and, often times does, 
violate those limitations.  To this day, there are no methods to 
objectively control police brutality.317 
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The consequence is qualitatively disproportionate punishment, which 
includes being “[h]andcuffed and pinned on [your] stomach by three 
police officers in a chokehold for nearly nine minutes” while crying out 
for your mother and attempting, in vain, to tell officers that you cannot 
breathe; being fatally shot while “[r]unning away from the police after 
a peaceful interrogation”; and being awakened after midnight by a 
police battering ram, shot indiscriminately, and denied immediate 
medical aid.318  Such brutality is often inflicted upon people — like 
George Floyd and countless others 319  — publicly, augmenting the 
indignity.  In the case of deadly force, police action is a “violent public 
spectacle of official homicide.” 320   Police-inflicted punishment is 
degrading, destructive of dignity, and in violation of theories of 
retribution and Eighth Amendment qualitative proportionality. 
C. Deterrence and Meaningfulness 
Deterrence has long been criticized as a punishment tool because it 
lacks meaningfulness if its ultimate goal is crime prevention. 321  
Deterrence-based sentences are premised on the notion that “criminal 
law formulations can influence conduct ‘on the street.’”322  However, if 
a potential offender cannot appreciate that his criminal conduct may 
be detected and that punishment will be severe or is not even aware of 
the punishment associated with his conduct, the punishment’s expected 
deterrent effect is lost. 
Professor Paul H. Robinson’s work criticizes deterrence as a 
principle for distributing punishment and focuses on the misguided 
efforts of legislative drafters to prevent crime by creating laws 
supported solely by deterrence.323  He suggested that deterrence-based 
punishment is grounded in three unpersuasive assumptions: (1) that 
criminal offenders know the law, (2) that criminal offenders “perceive 
the cost of violation [of the law] as greater than the perceived benefit,” 
and (3) that criminal offenders “bring such knowledge to bear on 
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[their] conduct decision at the time of the offense.”324  All three of 
these assumptions are erroneous because “most people do not know 
the law,” and even if they do, “a host of conditions . . . interfere with 
the rational calculation of self-interest by potential offenders.”325 
The false premise of deterrence extends to judges, who share the 
same delusion that their sentencing decisions deter criminal behavior 
and police-initiated punishment.  When police, rather than the law, 
punish people who have not yet been charged with a crime, the 
response is not crime prevention, but outrage.326  As in other instances, 
this type of punishment carries no deterrent effect, and, therefore, 
lacks genuine meaningfulness.  Though sentencing reform is imperfect, 
the goals and approaches of recent sentencing reform efforts are 
instructive to police reform, and ultimately make a case for police 
defunding. 
V. SENTENCING REFORM EFFORTS 
Punishment has undergone drastic transformations since the 
founding of the Union. 327   Under colonial rule, beliefs in man’s 
inherent depravity led to swift, harsh punishment. 328   After the 
Revolutionary War, scholars and theologians boasted of humans’ 
redeemable qualities, and punishment began to shift towards a more 
rehabilitative scheme. 329   By the late 1800s, however, the near-
exclusive purpose of punishment was rehabilitation with retribution 
and deterrence playing only incidental roles.330 
A. Judicial Discretion and Sentencing 
In the 1960s, rehabilitation came under great scrutiny, and 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, leaders questioned its efficacy.331  As 
a result, Congress initiated an extensive investigation into the state of 
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federal sentencing, ultimately concluding that “[w]e know too little 
about human behavior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a 
routine basis or even to determine accurately whether or when a 
particular prisoner has been rehabilitated.” 332   In the name of 
sentencing reform, leaders rebelled against judges’ unfettered 
discretion in sentencing, decrying that judges administered sentences 
arbitrarily and inconsistently, often for identical offenses.333  Shunning 
rehabilitation models, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 
endorsed retribution and deterrence as the principal purposes of 
federal punishment.334  Its sentencing provisions were included in the 
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), which convey that the “primary focus 
of sentencing attention was no longer the offender, but rather the 
offense.”335 
The SRA transformed the country’s punishment model from 
rehabilitative to retributive and deterrent.336  It stripped judges of the 
sentencing authority they had exercised for years,337 tying their hands 
to lengthy, determinate mandatory minimum sentencing, diluting their 
ability to consider offenders’ unique circumstances.  Realizing that 
judges were perhaps too constricted, the Supreme Court declared 
mandatory minimums advisory.338   Rendering mandatory minimum 
sentences advisory in later years, however, did little to empower 
sentencing judges to reduce the imposition of excessively lengthy 
mandatory minimum criminal sentences.339 
Guidelines formulation and application represent biased responses 
to the widely accepted problem of unfairness and inconsistency in 
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federal sentencing.340  Since liberal and conservative sensibilities had 
already abandoned rehabilitation, the necessity of its demise needed 
only be gently confirmed.341  The Commissioners based the Guidelines 
on the unsound psychological factor of “average current practice.”342  
Today, sentencing reformers are stuck, attempting to slog through the 
mess and undo decades of damage resulting from lengthy mandatory 
minimum sentences. 
The SRA’s sentencing scheme failed to achieve the type of 
uniformity or fairness that reformers sought.  Recent studies support 
the conclusion that lengthier sentences directly lead to increased 
recidivism rates, negatively affect efforts to rehabilitate prisoners, and 
are unfairly and undeservedly issued for most, if not all, of the 
examined offenses.343  Leaders did not foresee the SRA’s legacy of 
excessively long federal criminal sentences.  The Sentencing 
Commission’s legacy lingers today in the form of severe mandatory 
sentences, 344  limited parole opportunities, 345  and astoundingly 
increased numbers of incarcerated offenders.346   “Unfortunately, in 
many respects the Guidelines are the product of crafters’ creative 
imaginations and their biases.”347 
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B. Defunding: A Different View of Reform 
Criminal sentencing’s punitive nature and reliance on bias are not 
unique to sentencing schemes but are evident in other forms of 
punishment, especially police-initiated punishment.348  Likewise, the 
dangerous myth of Black criminality, which guides police use of force, 
bespeaks centuries of ingrained, institutionally sanctioned 
discrimination and oppression.349  Through various proposals, modern-
day reformers seek to overhaul the entire system by eliminating bias, 
reintroducing the concept of rehabilitation, and prohibiting 
unreasonably lengthy criminal sentences. 350   Whether through the 
imposition of particular purpose sentencing or the inclusion of 
experimentalist theory in determining how much punishment is 
enough, current-day reforms pursue a total dismantling of the current 
system because it is so incredibly entrenched in inequality.351 
The history of police use of force is no different.  Modern-day 
sentencing reformers request that judges, constrained by objective, 
purpose-informed sentencing goals, make more individualized and 
informed sentencing decisions.  These types of reforms require a 
complete and total shift in how criminal processes are viewed.  
Abolitionist democracy theory is instructive. 
Abolitionist democracy is central to the concept of police defunding.  
In contrast to traditional reform efforts, proponents of abolitionist 
theory acknowledge the backdrop of oppression that is attached to 
every level of every institution in the United States and assert that “the 
very foundations of existing conceptions of legal justice are inadequate, 
compromised, limited in the ideas of justice exhorted, and corrupted 
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by inescapably vicious and inegalitarian institutional histories and 
cultures.”352 
Per abolitionist democracy theory, reform of any systemically racist 
system requires disruption of racist narratives.353  The theory “calls for 
a constellation of democratic institutions and practices to displace 
policing and imprisonment while working to realize more equitable 
and fair conditions of collective life.”354 
[T]he abolition of slavery was accomplished only in the negative 
sense.  In order to achieve the comprehensive abolition of slavery — 
after the institution was rendered illegal and black people were 
released from their chains — new institutions should have been 
created to incorporate black people into the social order . . . .355 
In the area of prison reform, abolitionist democracy efforts consist of 
“embrac[ing] both a negative or deconstructive project of dismantling 
penal systems and a positive project of world-building.”356  Such work 
involves “the creation of an array of social institutions that would begin 
to solve the social problems that set people on the track to prison, 
thereby helping to render the prison obsolete.”357 
Akin to police defunding, abolitionist theory requires “a 
democratically informed effort to target the causes of interpersonal 
harm while ensuring peace and well-being, as well as the displacement 
of policing and imprisonment in connection with efforts to realize 
greater social and economic equality.”358  For each, the overarching 
goal is to overhaul unjust resource allocations, and “build local 
democratic power to reinvest public resources in projects that actually 
provide meaningful security, while simultaneously reducing the violent 
theft perpetrated daily by mainstream economic practices and 
institutions.”359 
Similar to discussions regarding sentencing reform, abolitionist 
democracy theory provides a framework that urges a complete 
overhaul of current police practices.  In drawing from instances where 
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the government declined to prosecute or juries neglected to convict 
officers for brutalizing people, abolitionists claim that even convictions 
would ultimately fail to produce equitable outcomes because they 
would neglect to change the “institutional and cultural dynamics 
responsible for the pervasive violence of policing.”360  In such cases, the 
problem is not that deserving, “isolated ‘bad apple[s]’”361  have not 
been appropriately punished, but that policing methods, systems, and 
processes that permit brutality as a regular occurrence remain intact.  
They continue to operate against “the backdrop of a status quo”362 that 
is steeped in racism and inequality. 363   In the case of policing, 
abolitionist democracy theorists urge a complete reimagining of police 
functioning and practice.  This model is critical in attempting to view 
punishment differently, such that genuine rebuilding can be realized.364 
CONCLUSION: ANTIRACIST SENTENCING REFORM INCLUDES 
DEFUNDING THE POLICE 
This unique moment, when there is increased public interest in being 
antiracist –– “a radical choice in the face of this history, requiring a 
radical reorientation of our consciousness” 365  –– presents an 
opportunity for reform.  The face of U.S. history is fraught with using 
police force to control, oppress, and traumatize Black Americans.366  
Still today, police force is imposed in racially discriminatory ways that 
display the incidences and badges of policing’s roots in slavery, and the 
police funding model supports and institutionalizes this racism.367 
Defunding the police answers the antiracist call to radically reorient 
the public consciousness and faith in the entire criminal justice system, 
which has been undermined by the routine use of force against Black 
Americans.  Legal standards for challenging the excessiveness of police 
force based on reasonableness reap unreasonable outcomes that reflect 
biased views of Black criminality.  Reconceptualizing these aspects of 
policing as punishment situates the defund movement within the 
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widely accepted sentencing reform movement and reorients policing as 
punishment outside of the protections of the criminal process.  This 
reorientation recognizes that police-initiated punishment fails to fulfill 
the legitimate purposes of criminal punishment and is, therefore, in 
need of an entire overhaul. 
True systemic change can only happen in conjunction with 
eradicating racism.  The movement to defund the police is “a call to 
reinvent our criminal justice system to better honor our national pledge 
of equal justice under the law.”368  We can do this by calling policing 
what it is: punishment.  We will no longer stand for a racist system of 
sentencing son the streets or in the courts. 
 
 
 368. Hostetler & Gammage, supra note 13, at 27. 
